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PART PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO PAROL
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LANDS
DONALD KEPNER*
Part II**
VARIATIONS IN THE FORM OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN
VARIOUS STATES
W HILE the courts have considered the State of Frauds as adopt-
ed in the various states to be reenactments of the English act,
even a cursory reading discloses that the statute as a Whole, and
Section Four in particular' has been stated in substantially different
language in the majority of the American jurisdictions.
The point was minimized in our study of the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of part performance 2 because it was not one
of the factors that produced confusion in the law. Since the
various statutes were interpreted to have the samemeaning, in-
consistencies in the cases must be charged to the judges construing
the Act rather than to its draftsman. In fact the framers of the en-
actment, as the following paragraphs will reveal, attempted to
*Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law.
**Part I of this discussion appearing in 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1950), re-
viewed the historical development of the doctrine of part performance. Part
II will deal with the law of part performance analytically, and will attempt
to describe the present status of this segment of the law. The cases cited are
representative only and are selected from over twelve hundred that were
examined by the author.
1. Statute 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677). Section Four states, ..... And be it
further enacted by the authority aforesaid that from and after the said
four and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought... (4) . . . upon
any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or
concerning them .... unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized."
2. 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1950).
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eliminate entirely the doctrine of part performance in some of the
states.3
In only a third of the states has the legislature used without
qualification substantially the same language adopted by the authors
of the parent act. While eleven 4 of the sixteen statutes, modeled
after the original act, provide that no action shall be brought to
charge any person upon such contracts, the other five5 varied the
terminology of the Enactment by stating that there could be no
action brought on the agreement unless the latter be in writing.
The adoption of the borrowed statute under modern rules of
construction carries with it approval of the adjudication interpreting
the parent act. All but three 6 of this group felt bound to adopt part
performance as a judicial refinement of the English act, although
in more than one instance the court declared that the British deci-
sions on the point were contradictory7 and irreconcilable.3
A quartet of jurisdictions modified the phraseology so as to
provide that all contracts to sell or convey land should be void or
invalid unless in writing. In only one10 of these states was the
statute strictly construed, and the doctrine of part performance re-
jected. The remaining three jurisdictions in this category have no
basis upon which to justify part performance in view of the un-
ambiguous language found in their act. It is not, however, seriously
suggested that all the former decisions in these three states be over-
ruled at this late date, even though erroneous in their inception.
It has been previously observed"- that the phrase "no action
may be brought" as embodied in the original act refers to suits at
law, but not to complaints or bills in equity. Based on the reason-
ing that the word action had such limited meaning in 1677, the
3. See text to note 13 injra.
4. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 38-101 (1947) ; Del. Rev. Code §3106 (1935)
Ill. Rev. Stat. § 59-2 (1949) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-106 (1935) ; Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 371.010 (1948) ; Mass. Gen. Laws c. 259, § 1 (1932) ; Miss. Code
Ann. § 264 (1942) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3352 (1939) ; Ohio Code Ann.
§ 8621 (Baldwin Rev. 1941); R. I. Gen. Laws c. 481, § 1 (1938) ; S. C. Code
Ann. § 7044 (1942).
5. Me. Rev. Stat. § 95-4 (1946) ; N. H. Rev. Laws c. 381, § 1 (1942)
N. J. Stat. Ann. § 25:1-5 (1937) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 7831 (Williams 1934);
Virginia Code Ann. § 11-2 (1950).
6. Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee. See 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 15
(1950).
7. Thornton v. Vaughan, 2 Scam. (3 Ill.) 299 (1840).
8. Hayden v. McIlwain, 4 Bibb. (7 Ky.) 57 (1815).
9. N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-2 (1943) ; Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 163
(1941) ; Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1716 (1947); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5-101
(1945).
10. North Carolina. See cases cited 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1950).
11. See 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1950).
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proponents of the ideal claim that the distinction was recognized
by the draftsman .'2 To prevent misunderstanding on this score, six
statutes13 provide that in relation to oral contracts for the sale of
land, "no civil action shall be maintained," or "no contract shall be
enforceable," unless it is in writing. These acts represent obvious
attempts to exclude part performance since civil actions, or suits to
enforce oral contracts include bills or complaints in equity.
Although in eighteen' 4 of the forty-eight states the statute is
framed in one of the forms described above, it also contains a
proviso expressly recognizing part performance. In a majority's of
the enactments of this type, reference is made only to the jurisdiction
of the court specifically to enforce the oral contract if partly per-
formed, although in a handful of states1" the statute sets out the
nature of the acts constituting grounds for equitable relief.
These exceptions are important because they represent a recog-
nition that the principle underlying part performance is sound and
just. In more than one instance the exception was a legislative
afterthought, the law-makers no doubt having been influenced by
the construction accorded the statute by those courts which as a
matter of policy either denied or restricted the application of the
doctrine of part performance.
Maryland, 17 New Mexico' 8 and Pennsylvania 9 either have no
provisions that correspond with- Section Four of the British Act
or else in the process of revising the statutes, that part of Section
Four dealing with land contracts has been lost. Florida 20 and
12. Costigan, Has There been Judicial Legislation in the Interpreta-
tion of the Statute of Frauds, 14 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1919).
13. Ariz. Code Ann. Stat. § 58-101 (1939) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8293
(1949) ; S. D. Code § 10.0605 (1939) ; Tex. Stat. Rev. Civ. art. 3995 (1925)
Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1716 (1947) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 3523 (1949).
14. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 20, § 3 (1940) ; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1971 (Deer-
ing 1949) ; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 71, § 8 (1935) ; Ga. Code § 20-401 (1933) ; Idaho
Code § 9-504 (1947) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 33-413 (Burns 1949) ; Iowa Code
§ 62232 (1946) ; La. Civ. Code § 2275 (1870) ; Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.10
(1948); 2 Minn. Stat. § 513.04 (1949) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 13-606
(1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-103 (1943); Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. § 1529
(1929); N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 270; N. D. Rev. Code § 47-1001 (1943) ;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 2-906 (1940); Utah Code Ann. § 33-5-8 (1943);
Wis. Stat. § 240.09 (1949).
15. Cal., Colo., Idaho, Ind., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev., N. Y.,
N. D., Ore., Utah and Wis.
16. Ala., Ga., Iowa and La. in part.
17. Maryland has adopted some portions of the Statute of Frauds,
but apparently not the provisions relating to contracts for the sale of lands.
18. The Statute of Frauds is not indexed in the New Mexico Code. See
Revised Statutes. N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941).
19. Pennsylvania enacted most of the statute except as to Section 4 inso-
far as it relates to land contracts. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 1 (Supp. 1949).
20. Fla. Stat. c. 689 (1941).
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Washington 21 require all instruments which transfer an interest of
freehold or term for more than one year to be by deed, and appar-
ently do not have a separate provision for contracts as such.
REQUISITES OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DISTINGUISHED FROM
THOSE OF PART PERFORMANCE
Although the doctrine of part performance is occasionally dis-
cussed in other types of actions, the predominate number of cases
involve suits for specific execution.
In analyzing particular cases, the judiciary commonly fall into
the error of not distinguishing the elements comprising part per-
formance from those relating to specific performance. This is
demonstrated by statements purporting to establish standards for
determining part performance in which it is declared that the
contract proved must be the one pleaded, 2 2 that the contract must
be certain, -3 that it must be free from ambiguity24 or doubt, and that
it must be established by evidence that is clear, definite and un-
equivocal.2 5 Applied to actions involving written contracts as well
as oral, the above standards go to the question of whether or not
the chancellor should exercise his discretionary prerogative to
grant equitable relief, a determination that should be considered
separately from the question of whether or not part performance has
taken place.
Equally misleading are the statements that classify the' pay-
ment of consideration as an act of part performance. While origi-
nally payment of the consideration was regarded as sufficient justifi-
21. Wash. Rev. Stat. § 10550 (Remington 1939).
22. Mundorf v. Kilbourn, 4 Md. 459 (1853) ; Cherbonier v. Cherbonier,
18 S. W. 1083 (Mo. 1891) ; Hersman v. Hersman, 253 Mo. 175, 161 S. W.
800 (1913) ; Abbott v. Baldwin, 61 N. H. 583 (1881) ; Cole v. Potts, 10
N. J. Eq. 67 (1854); Plymale v. Comstock, 9 Ore. 318 (1881) ; Adams v.
Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 Pac. 465 (1915).
23. Tate v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216 (1877) ; Wright v. Raftree, 181 Ill. 464,
54 N. E. 998 (1899) ; Rath v. Klegener, 252 Ill. 135, 185 N. E. 223 (1933) ;
Van Epps v. Clock, 53 Hun. 638, 7 N. Y. Supp. 21 (1889) ; Odell v. Moren,
5 Ore. 96 (1873) ; Fabra v. Fabra, 221 S. W. 1008 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ;
Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 17, 257 Pac. 1046 (1927) ; Campbell v. Fetter-
man, 20 W. Va. 398 (1882) ; Westfall v. Cottrells, 24 W. Va. 763 (1884) ;
East v. Atkinson, 117 Va. 490, 85 S. E. 468 (1915) ; Blanchard v. McDongal,
6 Wis. 167, 70 Am. Dec. 458 (1857).
24. Wallace v. Brown, 10 N. J. Eq. 308 (1854) ; Herrold v. Ross, 112
S. W. 2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; Boland v. Niklos, 77 Utah 205, 293
Pac. 7 (1930).
25. Mundorf v. Kilbourn, 4 Md. 459 (1853); Billingshea v. Ward, 33
Md. 48 (1870) ; Hersman v. Hersman, 253 Mo. 175, 161 S. W. 800 (1913) ;
Tate v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216 (1877) ; Frebrache v. Frebrache, 110 Ill. 210
(1884) ; Wright v. Raftree, 181 Ill. 464, 54 N. E. 998 (1889) ; Rath v.
Degener, 352 Ill. 135, 185 N. E. 223 (1933) ; Cole v. Potts, 10 N. J. Eq. 67
(Ch. 1854) ; Wallace v. Brown, 10 N. J. Eq. 308 (1854); Van Epps v.
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cation for the equitable enforcement of parol agreements 26 the cases
have conclusively determined that in the absence of a statute,2 7 pay-
ment of the consideration is not an act of part performance..2 1 While
the soundness of this holding may be questioned,8 2a it is nevertheless
the law.
If the act of making full or part payment will not take a case
out of the statute, will it in conjunction with other acts constitute
part performance? It is submitted that the response to this inquiry
is no. Payment no longer is relevant to the question of part per-
formance, although it is pertinent in ascertaining whether or not the
vendee is in default. The latter determination is made in all cases-
involving specific execution. Whether the agreement be written
or oral, equitable assistance will be withheld from a defaulting vendee.
Scattered among the cases are statements that part payment
when coupled with delivery of possession will take a case out of the
operation of the statute.29 It is submitted that part or whole pay-
Clock, 53 Hun. 638, 7 N. Y. Supp. 21 (1889) ; Conkovich v. Conkovich, 144
Neb. 904, 15 N. W. 2d 66 (1944) ; Goff v. Kelsey, 78 Ore. 337, 153 Pac. 103
(1915); Boland v. Nihlos, 77 Utah 205, 293 Pac. 7 (1930); Blanchard v.
McDougal, 6 Wis. 167, 70 Am. Dec. 458 (1857).
26. Sugden, The Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates 75 (1807).
27. Iowa Code § 622.32 (1946).
28. Underhill v. Allen, 18 Ark. 466 (1857) ; Forrester v. Flores, 64 Cal. 24,
28 Pac. 107 (1883) ; Woerner v. Woerner, 171 Cal. 298, 152 Pac. 919 (1915) ;
Kimberly v. Fox, 27 Conn. 307 (1858) ; Green v. Jones, 73 Me. 563 (1885) ; Cap-
lan v. Buckner, 123 Md. 590, 91 Ati. 481 (1914) ; Lanz v. McLaughlin, 14 Minn.
72 (1869); Townsend v. Fenton, 32 Minn. 482, 21 N. W. 726 (1884);
Lydich v. Holland, 83 Mo. 703 (1884) ; Ducie v. Ford, 8 Mont. 233, 19 Pac.
414 (1888); Price v. Price, 17 Fla. 605 (1880); Goddard v. Donaha, 42
Kan. 754, 22 Pac. 708 (1889); Cuppy v. Hixon, 29 Ind. 522 (1868) ; Mather
v. Scoles, 35 Ind. 1 (1870); Rucher v. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396 (1881);
Temple v. Johnson, 71 Ill. 13 (1873) ; Kohlbrecker v. Guettermann, 329 Ill.
I1. 246, 160 N. E. 142 (1928) ; Peters v. Dickinson, 67 N. H. 389, 32 Atl. 154,
(1893) ; Brown v. Brown, 33 N. J. Eq. 650 (Err. & App. 1881) ; Cochrane
v. UcEntree, 51 Atl. 279 (N.J. 1896); Titus v. Taylor, 65 Atl. 1003 (N.J.
Ch. 1907) ; Milholland v. Payne, 169 App. Div. 712, 155 N. Y. Supp. 773
(1916), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 675, 113 N. E. 1061 (1917) ; Ganwer v. Fry,
17 Pa. St. 491, 55 Am. Dec. 578 (1851) ; Spencer and Newbolds' Appeal,
80 Pa. St. 317 (1876) ; Baker v. Wiswell, 17 Neb. 52, 22 N. W. 111 (1885) ;
Hickey v. Ross, 172 P. 2d 771 (Okla. Supp. Ct. 1946) ; Garner v. Stubble-
field, 5 Tex. 552 (1851) ; Thomas v. Francis, 129 Tex. 759, 106 S. W. 2d
257 (1935) ; Brown v. Pollard, 89 Va. 696, 17 S. E. 6 (1893) ; Brandes v.
Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142 (1860). Contra: Matthews v. Wier, 10 Del. Ch.
63, 84 Atl. 878 (1912) (if evidence of payment is in writing).
28a. There is no sound reason why full payment of the purchase price, if
accepted by the vendor should not take a case out of the statute. If there is any
question as to whether or not the amount paid is for the payment of a debt
rather than for the purchase of land, the vendor is now free to explain the
transaction. The removal of the disqualification of the parties to testify takes
away the only reason for the rule.
29. Webb v. Marlan, 83 Ark. 340, 104 S. W. 144 (1907) ; Arkadelphia
Lumber Co. v. Thornton, 83 Ark. 403, 104 S. W. 169 (1907) ; Julten v. Deeble,
88 Colo. 301, 295 Pac. 496 (1931); Dickerson v. Chrisman, 28 Mo. 134
1951]
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ment adds nothing to the vendee's case of part performance and
that he must must rely entirely on the transfer of possession.
Those judges that have analyzed the problem agree that the
vendee is not required to make payment in advance of the date
fixed in the contract.30 While tendering payment makes out a better
case for specific execution and creates greater equities it does
not add to part performance. Usually the contract will call for part
payment at the time possession is delivered. If the purchaser is not
required however to make payment until some future date specific
performance may be denied on the ground of hardship to the vendor,
notwithstanding there has been part performance. It is reiterated
that in these cases the subject of consideration is relevant only to
the question of default by the vendee or hardship to the vendor,
but not to the issue of part performance.
IT IS THE PRINCIPLE NOT THE LAW OF PART PERFORMANCE
THAT IS CONFUSED
While the American states received the doctrine of part per-
formance as promulgated by the British courts they failed to recog-
nize that the doctrine involved two types of cases.
On the one hand the act of the vendor in delivering possession
constituted part performance. On the other hand if the vendee was
already in possession, it was necessary that he perform some other
act in order to take the case out of the statute. Entirely different
principles were involved in the two situations.31
Overlooking the basic difference in the two lines of cases, the
American tribunals did not understand the rationalization of the
Britsh adjudications. Ultimately they misapplied not only the
principles promulgated by the English courts but also rules pro-
nounced in their own adjudgments. As a result of this misunder-
standing, and of this misapplication, the case law as late as 1850
(1859) ; Johnson v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513, 22 S. W. 492 (1893); Frances
v. Green, 7 Idaho 668, 65 Pac. 362 (1901) ; King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223,
118 Pac. 292 (1911) ; Witt v. Boothe, 98 Kan. 554, 58 Pac. 851 (1916);
Meriwether v. Andrews, 44 Barb. Ch. 200 (N.Y. 1865) ; Pauling v. Pauling,
86 Hun. 502 (1895), aff'd, 150 N. Y. 574, 44 N. E. 1127 (1895) ; Richards v.
Edwell, 48 Pa. St. 361 (1865) ; Perryman v. Woodward, 37 Okla. 792, 133
Pac. 244 (1913) ; Wayne v. Butterfield, 50 S. D. 463, 210 N. W. 663 (1926) ;
Middleton v. Selby, 19 W. Va. 167 (1881) ; Rapley v. Klugh, 40 S. C. 134,
18 S. E. 680 (1893) ; Bartz v. Paff, 95 Wis. 95, 69 N. W. 297 (1896).
30. Blunt v. Tomlin, 27 Ill. 93 (1862); Sprague v. Jessup, 48 Ore.
211, 83 Pac. 145, 4 L. R. A. (n.s.) 410 (1905).
31. The theories that have been proposed in explanation of the posses-
sion cases are stated in the text at Note 37, infra. The improvement cases
are discussed in the text at Note 54, infra.
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was indeed perplexing.32 If however, all the opinions could be erased
from the books and the decisions analyzed on their facts it is clear
that the American courts have been remarkably consistent in their
adjudication of these cases. Paradoxically, it is not the law but
rather the doctrine of part performance that defies analysis.
In the great majority of jurisdictions the acts that will take
an oral contract out of the statute of frauds have been judicially
determined. While the reasons offered by a tribunal may fluctuate
with the change of its personnel, once the court recognizes acts to
be part performance the acts remain undisturbed by explanation
or logic.
It follows that the facts, not reason, is the basis for stating the
law of part performance, and it is in terms of facts that we offer
an analysis of the segment of the law.
TRANSFER OF POSSESSION Is PART PERFORMANCE
When pursuant to the contract possession is delivered to the
vendee by the vendor, 33 or the vendee takes possession with the
express or implied consent of the vendor,34 such acts are generally,
although not universally considered to be an act of part performance.
Possession will be recognized only if it is exclusive, visible and
notorious.35 If any of these elements are lacking the plaintiff must
seek another theory upon which to base his case. 6 If, however, the
32. See Part I of this discussion printed in 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 20(1950).
33. Pindell v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249 (1883); Andrew v. Babcock, 63
Conn. 109, 26 Ati. 715 (1896); Pleasanton v. Raughley, 3 Del. Ch. 124
(1867); Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 998 (1909) ; Kinderland v.
Kirk, 131 Ga. 454, 62 S. E. 582 (1908) ; Charprot v. Sigerson, 25 Mo. 63
(1857) ; Wolf v. Eagleson, 29 Idaho 177, 159 Pac. 1122 (1916).
34. Fritz v. Mills, 170 Cal. 449, 150 Pac. 375 (1915) ; Bradley v.
Loveday, 98 Conn. 315, 119 Atl. 147 (1922); Tate v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216
(1877) ; Kinderland v. Kirk, 131 Ga. 454, 62 S. E. 582 (1908) ; Waymire v.
Waymire, 141 Ind. 164, 40 N. E. 523 (1895) ; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Stewart,
180, N. J. Eq. 489 (1867) ; Charprot v. Sizerson, 25 Mo. 63 (1857) ; Williams
v. Beckmark, 146 Neb. 814, 21 N. W. 2d 745 (1946) ; Collins v. Lackey, 31
Okla. 776, 123 Pac. 1118, 40 L. R. A. (n.s.) 883, 1913E Ann. Cas. 507
(1912) ; Martin v. Patterson, 27 S. C. 621. 2 S. E. 859 (1888) ; Hopfensper v.
Bruehl, 174 Wis. 426, 183 N. W. 171 (1921).
35. Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 113 Pac. 147 (1910); Wood v.
Anderson. 199 Cal. 440, 249 Pac. 862 (1926) ; Frostburg Coal Co. v. Thistle,
20 Md. 186 (1863) ; Poland v. O'Connor, 1 Neb. 50, 93 Am. Dec. 327 (1871) ;
Boese v. Childress, 80 Okla. 60, 200 Pac. 997 (1921) ; Miller v. Zufall. 113
Pa. St. 317, 6 Atl. 350 (1886) ; Miller v. Lorenz, 39 W. Va. 160, 19 S. E.
391 (1849).
36. The question of exclusive possession arises when one co-tenant con-
veys his interest to another co-tenant. Neither tenant is in exclusive possession.
The vendee must show fraud in the sense the word is used in this discussion
before he is entitled to equitable relief. Obviously possession may not be
transferred in such cases. For the discussion of the fraud cases see text at
note 82, infra.
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purchaser has succeeded in establishing delivery of possession, or if
he has taken possession with the assent of the seller, under the
alleged oral contract, he has made out his case of part performance.
Although various explanations have been offered for the fact
that possession will take a case out of the statute, no single inter-
pretation has survived all the critical examination to which it has
been subjected from time to time.3 7 Proposed by the courts in the
early cases was the theory that a vendee in possession would be a
trespasser if the contract were not enforced. 38 Time after time the
fallacy of this reasoning has been exposed. Ample authority sup-
ports the proposition that if the vendor consents to the possession
of the vendee the latter will be a licensee or tenant at will,39 but never
a trespasser. Also offered as a reason for holding that delivery
of possession is part performance is the concept that courts of equity
recognized livery of seisin as a form of conveyance despite the fact
that the statute eliminated it. ° This explanation neither appears in
the cases nor may it be supported by the historical facts. The chan-
cellor was interested in the oral agieement not in the form of the
conveyance.41 If the vendee had been permitted to take possession
by the vendor, the former was entitled to his conveyance. Prior to
the statute, equity enforced conveyances which were defective be-
cause of a lack of livery of seisin. 42 Insofar as equity was concerned
the only difference resulting from the statute of frauds was that
the recalcitrant vendor was now required to execute a conveyance
where formerly he'had only to make livery of seisin.
A popular explanation of the possession cases is the so-called
unequivocal reference theory.43 Reasoning that possession would
not have been delivered to the vendee in the absence of a contract
to sell or lease, the fact of possession is considered unequivocally
to point to an agreement. The fact of possession is a substitute for
the contract required by the statute.
37. Moreland, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 52, 67 (1928) ; Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 Equity,
33 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1920).
38. Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts 284 (3d ed. 1926). This
theory having appeared in the earlier editions of Pomeroy was frequently
restated by courts.
39. Browne, The Statute of Frauds 599 (5th ed. 1895) ; 3 Parsons, Law
of Contracts 395 (5th ed. 1866) ; Walsh, Cases on Equity 680 (1937).
40. Pound, supra note 37, at 939. Professor Pound does not propose to
indorse this explanation. He merely furnishes it as one of the possible
causes for equity's recognition of part performance.
41. It should be recalled that even prior to the Statute of Uses, equity
enforced oral land contracts if there were consideration.
42. See cases cited 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1950).
43. Moreland, supra note 37, at 75.
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Despite the wording of the act which in substance provides that
the oral agreement may not be enforced, the act under this view
is considered to be only evidential in character.44 Its effect is to ex-
clude oral contracts as evidence. Was not the purpose of the statute
to eliminate perjured testimony, the propounders of this theory
may ask?4"
Generally the American Courts have not accepted the un-
equivocal reference theory in the above form as a reason for recog-
nizing possession as part performance.
Succinctly stating his position on this score, one American
jurist has said:
"Part performance takes such a case out of the statute of frauds
not because it furnishes any greater proof of the contract, or
makes the contract any stronger but because it would be intoler-
able in equity for the owner of a tract of land to knowingly
suffer another to invest time, labor, and money on the lands,
upon the faith of a contract which did not exist. 4 1
The requirement that possession must be unequivocally referable
to the contract is not to be understood as meaning that it is evidence
of the contract. Rather it necessitates the buyer to establish that his
possession was taken pursuant to the contract. Unequivocal refer-
ence is a rule of exclusion applied negatively in the same manner as
the tort rule of proximate cause.4 7
If possession is taken because of reasons other than anticipation
of the vendor's performance, the possession claimed is not referable
to the contract. If the purchaser did not rely on the contract and did
not take possession because of it, he was not injured by the owner's
failure to perform. Unless the vendee acts in reliance on the vendor's
performance his conduct is not referable to the contract, and hence
there is no part performance.
Based on the legislative history of the Statute the explanation
has been advanced that Section Four of the Statute of Frauds did
not apply to courts of equity.48 Persuasive arguments may be offered
in support of this theory. While speculation on this score is inter-
esting, it serves no useful purpose. When once the chancellors de-
44. Maitland, Equity 305 (Brunyate ed. 1949).
45. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 409 (1898) ; Rabel, The
Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L. Q. Rev. 174 (1947).
46. Edwards v. Fry, 9 Kan. 417 (1872).
47. This is demonstrated by statements appearing in the cases in which
the courts explain the vendee's possession as not being referable to a con-
tract of purchase. He is in possession, but the contract is not the producing
cause responsible for the possession.
48. Costigan, supra note 12, at 9 n. 26.
19511
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cided litigation on the basis that the statute did not apply to equity,
the framers intention faded into the background.
In a handful of states there are adjudications to the effect that
a transfer of possession is not of itself part performance. 40 In a
number of other jurisdictions the question has not been deter-
mined.50 In the latter instance writers assumed, because of language
expressed in controversies involving other acts, that possession
would not comply with the standards set by the court. Such argu-
ment overlooks the distinction between the possession and the fraud
cases; moreover, it fails to account for the weight to be accorded
to the English rule and to the majority holding in this country.
Though there may be a lack of popular explanation for the posses-
sion cases, it is nevertheless settled that a transfer of possession is
such part performance that will take an oral contract out of the
statute of frauds. In a proper case, where the vendee has performed
and the contract is not unjust or harsh specific performance will be
decreed on behalf of either the vendor or vendee. 51
If the purchaser makes valuable improvements after possession
is delivered other equities arise in his favor. Normally, he will in
all likelihood make betterments because it is a natural tendency
to improve one's newly acquired property. His failure to do so will
not, however, prejudice his case if possession has been delivered to
him pursuant to the oral agreement.
ACTS OF PART PERFORMANCE WHERE DELIVERY OF POSSESSION
Is IMPOSSIBLE-ADDING OF IMPROVEMENT
As early as 170052 it was held by the British High Court that if
a lessee in possession added valuable improvements in reliance on
the lessor's oral promise to grant a new term, the contract was taken
out of the Statute of Frauds. But if the lessee or vendee merely
alleges a retention of possession without other acts, he fails to
establish a change in his status by reason of the oral agreement, and
is not entitled to equitable relief. Without exception, the cases have
49. Bell. v. Anderson, 220 Ill. 605, 127 N. E. 87 (1920) ; Bradley v.
Owsley, 74 Tex. 69, 11 S. W. 1052 (1889). There is also persuasive dicta
in the Mass. cases, although no holdings directly in point.
50. Ariz., Fla., Mont., Nev., N. D., Ore., R. I., and Wash.
51. In view of the fact that under the English rule, transfer of possession
with consent of the vendor is part performance, and in light of the fact that
there are few adjudications directly on point denying that a transfer of
possession is part performance in this country, it appears that a transfer of
possession is part performance. The dicta in other types of cases must be dis-
counted in view of the distinction in the various types of cases.
52. Lester v. Foxcraft, Colles 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 205 (H.L. 1700).
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adjudicated that retention of possession will not in itself be con-
sidered an act of part performance'3
While the reasoning behind these decisions has been stated
in a variety of forms, in reality, only two basic concepts are involved.
One notion is based on the premise that a statute designed to pre-
vent fraud should not be used as an instrument to perpetrate
fraud.5 4 The other theory is founded on the proposition that the
vendor's act in permitting the vendee to make expenditures raises a
separate equity, independent of the statute, which ought to be
protected. 5
Although a convincing argument can be urged that the money
value of the improvements may be easily computed,5 6 it is to no avail
for the cases have definitely settled the issue. Unquestionably the
expenditure of money for repairs in anticipation of ownership by
reason of the contract is part performance.1
7
53. Danforth v. Laney, 28 Ala. 274 (1856) (decided prior to Statute);
Ashcraft v. Tucker, 136 Ark. 447, 206 S. W. 896 (1915); Pickerell v. Morss,
97 Ill. 220 (1880) ; Pearson v. East, 36 Ind. 27 (1871) ; Carlise v. Brennan,
67 Ind. 12 (1879); Green v. Groves 109 Ind. 519, 10 N. E. 401 (1887) ; Peter-
son v. Hagamon, 162 Kan. 222, 175 P. 2d 118 (1946) ; Stoddard v. Tuch, 4
Md. Ch. 475 (1851); Messmore v. Cunningham, 78 Mich. 623, 44 N. W.
145 (1889) ; Dougherty v. Poppen, 316 Mich. 430, 25 N. W. 2d 580 (1947) ;
Wentworth v. Wentworth, 2 Minn. 277, 72 Am. Dec. 97 (1858) ; Turkington
v. Zuber, 100 N. J. Eq. 285, 134 Atl. 840 (Err. & App. 1926) ; Cawthorne v.
Seeger, 140 N. J. Eq. 218, 53 A. 2d 792 (Ch. 1947) ; Muir v. Chandler, 16
N. D. 551, 113 N. W. 1038 (1907) ; Lewis v. North, 62 Neb. 552, 87 N. W.
312 (1901).
54. Arguello v. Edinger, 10 Cal. 150 (1858) , Cannon v. Collins, 3 Del.
Cli. 132 (1867) ; Pater v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216 (1877) ; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45
Ind. 576 (1874) ; Arnold v. Stephenson, 79 Ind. 126 (1881); Corbly v.
Corbly, 280 Ill. 278, 117 N. E. 393 (1917); Soebnlein v. Pumphrey, 183
M d. 334, 37 A. 2d 843 (1944) ; Despain v. Carter, 21 Mo. 331 (1855) ; Dicker-
son v. Chrisman, 28 Mo. 134 (1859) ; Johnson v. Bell, 58 N. H. 395 (1878) ;
Nibert v. Baghurst, 47 N. J. Eq. (2 Dick.) 201, 20 Atl. 252 (Ch. 1900);
M1oril v. Cooper, 65 Barb. Ch. 512 (N.Y. 1873); Johnston v. Baddock,
83 Okla. 285, 201 Pac. 654 (1921) ; Wagonhurst v. Whitney, 12 Ore. 83,
6 Pac. 399 (1885); Minns v. Chandler, 21 S. C. 480 (1884); Slenson v.
Elfman, 26 S. D. 134, 128 N. W. 588 (1910); Granquist v. McKeon, 29
Wash. 2d 440, 187 P. 2d 623 (1947) ; Fisher v. Moolick, 13 Wis. 321 (1861).
55. Moore v. Gordon, 44 Ark. 334 (1884) ; Bushnell v. Rowland, 118
Mich. 618, 77 N. W. 271 (1898) ; Wisconsin & M. R. Co. v. McKenna, 139
Mich. 43, 102 N. W. 28 (1905) ; McKinly v. 1-esson, 202 N. Y. 24, 95 N. E.
32 (1911) ; Ann Berta Lodge No. 42 v. Leverton, 42 Tex. 18 (1875) ; Ryon
v. Wilson, 56 Tex. 36 (1881) ; Pach v. Hansbarger, 17 W.. Va. 313 (1880).
56. Specific execution being a much more accurate remedy than damages,
is a desirable one. There is also a strong phychological fact present in many
of these cases and that is the purchaser has undergone a change of status
from that of a cropper to a freeholder. Today we play down the distinction
although at an early day the difference had political as well as social im-
plications.
57. Weber v. Marshall, 19 Cal. 447 (1861) ; Green v. Finin, 35 Conn.
178 (1868).
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The improvements must be valuable and permanent,58 although
in determining their worth they may be considered in light of the
value of the land.59 In the event the land is relatively worthless,
alteration involving an expenditure of a small sum may satisfy this
requisite.
While the term is not used by the courts it would seem that
the improvements relied upon must involve capital expenditures
as distinguished from repairs required for maintenance. Such dif-
feren.tiation may be implied from the decisions on the one hand
holding that if the improvements are of the nature that only an
owner would add, the oral contract is taken out of the Statute6 0 as
distinguished from the cases on the other hand holding that the
making of minor repairs or changes does not constitute part per-
58. Condon v. Arizona Housing Corp., 63 Ariz. 125, 160 P. 2d 342
(1945) ; Rugen v. Vaughan, 142 Ark. 176, 218 S. W. 205 (1920) ; Board
of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County v. McDonald, 143 Fla. 377,
196 So. 859 (1940) ; Taylor v. Matthews, 53 Fla. 776, 44 So. 146 (1907) ;
Fleming v. Baker, 12 Idaho 346, 85 Pac. 1092 (1906) ; Indiana Const. Ma-
terials Co. v. Tauch, 118 Ind. App. 151, 75 N. E. 2d 197 (1947); Winslow
v. Winslow, 52 Ind. 8 (1875) ; Keys v. Test, 33 Ill. 316 (1864) ; Stevens v.
Wheeler, 25 Ill. (15 Peck.) 300 (1861) ; Gregg v. Hamilton, 12 Kan. 333
(1873); Holcomb v. Dowell, 15 Kan. 378 (1875); Woodbury v. Gardner,
77 Me. 68 (1885) ; Fowler v. Isabell, 202 Mich. 572, 168 N. W. 414 (1918) ;
Mournin v. Trainor, 63 Minn. 230, 65 N. W. 444 (1895); Anderson v.
Shockley, 82 Mo. 250 (1884); Hayes v. Kansas City Ft. S. & G. R. Co.,
108 Mo. 544, 18 S. W. 1115 (1891) ; Milwaukee Land .Co. v. Ruesink, 50
Mont. 489, 148 Pac. 396 (1915); Cobban v. Hecklen, 27 Mont. 245, 70
Pac. 805 (1902) ; Stevens v. Trafton, 36 Mont. 520, 93 Pac. 810 (1908) ; Big-
ler v. Baker, 40 Neb. 325, 58 N. W. 1026 (1894) ; Knox v. Kaelber, 140 N. J.
Eq. 598, 55 A. 2d 53, aflrming, 137 N. J. Eq. 494, 45 A. 2d 614 (1946) ; Fulp
v. Sill Mfg. Co., 101 Okla. 226, 224 Pac. 694 (1924) ; Moffett v. City Realty
Co., 185 P. 2d 947 (Okla. Sup. Ct., 1947) ; Skinner v. Furnas, 82 Ore. 414,
161 Pac. 962 (1916); West v. Washington & C. R. R. Co., 49 Ore. 436,
90 Pac. 666 (1907) ; Eberly v. Lehman, 100 Pa. St. 542 (1882) ; Milliken v.
Dravo, 67 Pa. St. (17 Smith P. F.) 230 (1871); Markus v. Poulson, 37
S. D. 328, 158 N. W. 406 (1916); Karlsson v. Odland, 46 S. D. 350, 192
N. W. 758 (1923) ; Hibbert v. Aylotl, 52 Tex. 530 (1880) ; McCarthy v.
May, 74 S. W. 804 (1903) ; Williams v. Sweatt, 208 S. W. 230 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919) ; Boland v. Nihlos, 77 Utah 205, 293 Pac. 7 (1930) ; Hunt v. Spaulding,
108 Vt. 309, 187 Atl. 379 (1936) ; Campbell v. Fetterman, 20 W. Va. 398
(1882) ; Ratliff v. Sommers, 55 W. Va. 30, 46 S. E. 712 (1904) ; Richardson v.
Tayler Land & Livestock Co., 25 Wash. 2d 518, 171 P. 2d 703 (1946);
Henrikson v. Henrikson, 143 Wis. 314, 127 N. W. 962, 33 L. R. A. (n.s.)
534 (1910).
59. Holste v. Baker, 223 Minn. 321, 26 N. W. 2d 273 (1947) ; Pratt
v. Seif, 207 Pa. St. 614, 57 Atl. 68 (1904) ; Babcock v. Lewis, 52 Tex. Civ.
App. 8, 113 S. W. 584 (1908); Cobb v. Johnson, 101 Tex. 440, 108 S. W.
811 (1908).
60. Standard Oil Co. v. Rice, 195 Ind. 653, 145 N. E. 768 (1924) ; Peck-
ham v. Balch, 49 Mich. 179, 13 N. W. 506 (1882); Neiber v. Baghurst,
25 Atl. 474 (N.J. Ch. 1892); White v. Poole, 73 N. H. 403, 62 At. 494
(1905); Hoover v. Baugh, 108 Va. 695, 62 S. E. 968, 128 Am. St. Rep.
985 (1908).
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formance. * The word permanent which creeps into the opinions
also suggests that the court is thinking in terms of capital outlay
in evaluating improvements added by the vendee.
Expenditures must be made pursuant to and in reliance on the
contract and not in anticipation that a contract will be executed at
some future date. It is beyond dispute that steps taken by the
vendee preparatory to entering into the contract are not acts of part
performance.
62
That the prospective buyer who incurs expenses by reason of
minor repairs, is not injured, is noted in the cases. It is observed
in these cases that the value of the rental often exceeds the expense
of maintenance so that there is no dollars and cents loss to the
vendee. 3
If valuable improvements are made by the purchaser, the ven-
dor may enforce the oral agreement on the theory that the character
of the freehold has been changed.6 4 Although the property may be
more valuable, it is stated that the seller should not be compelled
to take back the property in its changed condition.65 As would be
expected there are relatively few decisions on the point inasmuch
as the purchaser will usually perform if he has in fact increased
the value of the premises by reason of labor and money.
It is settled in this country except in Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina and Tennessee that valuable and permanent im-
provements added to the premises in reliance upon the contract and
with the acquiescence of the seller is part performance.66
61. Fulton v. Jansen, 99 Cal. 590, 34 Pac. 330 (1893); French v.
Mitchell, 92 Colo. 532, 22 P. 2d 644 (1933) ; Dragoo v. Dragoo, 50 Mich. 573
(1883) ; Taylor v. Von Schraeder, 107 Mo. 206, 16 S. W. 675 (1891) ; Carpen-
ter v. Tinglof, 76 N. H. 454, 84 Atl. 51 (1912) ; Bevans v. Young, 59 Hun. 619,
13 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1891); Life Savers' Club v. Mosher, 125 Misc. Rep.
341, 209 N. Y. Supp. 741 (1923); Mann v. Mann, 159 Va. 240, 165 S. E.
522 (1932).
62. Shepherd v. Niles, 14 Del. Ch. 316, 125 Atl. 669 (1924) ; Bell v.
Anderson, 292 Ill. 605, 127 N. E. 87 (1920) ; Fickett v. Durham, 109 Mass.
419 (1872) ; Despain v. Carter, 21 Mo. 331 (1855).
63. Cook v. Erwin, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 584, 133 S. W. 897 (1911);
Fabra v. Fabra, 221 S. W. 1008 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Hargreaves v.
Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 Pac. 262, 33 A. L. R. 1481 (1922); Boland v.
Niklos, 77 Utah 205, 293 Pac. 7 (1930). Contra: Young v. Overbaugh, 145
N. Y. 158, 39 N. E. 712 (1895).
64. Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Mich. 360,168 N. W. 485, 1918F L. R. A. 384
(1918) ; Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N. Y. 365, 196 N. E. 291 (1935).
65. Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N. Y. 365, 196 N. E. 291 (1935). Contra:
Palumbo v. James, 266 Mass. 1, 164 N. E. 466 (1929).
66. See notes 54 and 55 supra.
1951]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ACTS OF PART PERFORMANCE WHERE DELIVERY OF POSSESSION
IS IMPOSSIBLE-SERVICES
The bulk of current litigation involving part performance arises
from oral contracts for the performance of service in consideration
of a promise to convey or devise the promisor's property to the
promisee.
Because they have attempted to adjudicate this type of con-
troversy in accordance with principles advanced in other part per-
formance cases, courts have had a great deal of difficulty, as sub-
sequent paragraphs will reveal, in finding a rational basis for the
results.
In some jurisdictions the rendition of services, regardless of
their nature, was considered to be only the payment of the con-
sideration.6 7 Thus in line with the rule that payment of considera-
tion is not part performance, these cases refused to enforce the
oral agreement.
Other tribunals applied the possession test, which was tanta-
mount to denying relief in most of the cases.6s By the terms of the
contract the parties usually contemplated that the grantor would re-
main in possession during his lifetime and that the promisee would
not reap his reward until after the promisor's death.
When formalism gave way to equity in a number of states, some
strange rules appeared. One such example was the line of decisions
reasoning that continuation in possession by the promisee after
the death of the promisor satisfied the requisite that the promisee be
placed in possession.69 The fallacy of this approach is obvious when
67. Suman v. Springate, 67 Ind. 115 (1879); Russell v. Briggs, 165
N. Y. 500, 59 N. E. 303, 53 L. R. A. 556 (1901) ; Farrin v. Matthews, 62
Ore. 517, 124 Pac. 675, 41 L. R. A. (n.s.) 184 (1912).
68. Jones v. Jones, 219 Ala. 62, 121 So. 78 (1929) ; Knight v. Smith,
250 Ala. 113, 33 So. 2d 242 (1947); Lay v. Lay, 75 Ark. 526, 87 S. W.
1026 (1905) ; Veau v. Veau, 57 Cal. App. 66, 207 Pac. 39 (1928) ; Cronk
v. Trumble, 66 Ill. 428 (1872) ; Donnelly v. Fletemeyer, 94 Ind. App. 337,
176 N. E. 868 (1931), rehearing denied, 94 Ind. App. 337, 179 N. E. 190;
Pond v. Sheean, 132 Ill. 312, 23 N. E. 1018, 8 L. R. A. 414 (1890) ; Johns v.
Johns, 67 Ind. 440 (1879) ; Baldwin v. Squier, 31 Kan. 283, 1 Pac. 591 (1884) ;
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 73 Kan. 39, 84 Pac. 568, 4 L. R. A. (n.s.) 957 (1906) ;
Devinney v. Carey, 52 Hun 612, 5 N. Y. Supp. 289 (1889); Brown v.
Lord, 7 Ore. 302 (1879) ; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 22 Pa. St. 237 (1853)
Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 114, 15 A. L. R. 216 (1921);
Ward v. Stuart, 62 Tex. 333 (1884) ; Lester v. Lester, 28 Gratt. 737 (Va.
1877) ; Rodman v. Rodman, 112 Wis. 378, 88 N. W. 218 (1901) ; Marshall
& Ilsley Bank v. Schuerbrock, 195 Wis. 203, 217 N. W. 416 (1928).
69. Typical of this type of case is Warren v. Warren, 105 Ill. 568(1882) in which the court declared: "He (the father) was nearly eighty-
four years old at the time of his death and could not have been active in its
management and control .... she (promisee) could not have had any greater
possession (except) by turning her . . .aged father upon the cold charities
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it is considered that the death of the promisor does not change
the status of the claimant, although it probably produces the uncom-
fortable realization that the papers were never drawn. At the
death of the offeror, nothing more can be done by the offeree in the
matter of performance. The latter's rights must be determined as
they existed when that event occurred.
Other judges have considered that the claimant by moving on
the premises in accord with the agreement, has taken possession.
While it was conceded that this was not exclusive possession it was
proposed by the judiciary that this was the best possession *possible
under the circumstances .7 More formalistic in their view, other
courts rejected outright this argument, holding that this type of
possession did not satisfy the test of exclusiveness. 71
In defense of the former view that the promisee has satisfied the
requisite of possession, it may be said that in many instances it is
more in keeping with the actualities of the situation than the more
strict view. Consider the fact that many of the lawsuits arose in the
farming country of the middle west where not infrequently one of
the sons supports his aging parents in anticipation of receiving the
farm on the latter's death. Is the infirm and feeble father in posses-
sion or is it his son who is actively engaged in managing the entire
farming operation? More than one justice has considered the son
to be in possession. In other cases a judge might logically conclude
that where the father was still vigorous the latter was actually as
of the world .... But over and above this, after her father's death no one
does or will deny that she was in open, notorious, visible and undisputed
possession."
70. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 287 Ill. 213, 122 N. E. 472 (1919) ; Dalby v.
Maxfield, 244 Ill. 214, 91 N. E. 420, 135 Am. St. Rep. 312 (1910); Taylor v.
Taylor, 79 Kan. 161, 99 Pac. 814 (1909) ; Brown v. Freudenberg, 106 Ind.
App. 692, 17 N. E. 2d 865 (1939) ; Kenyon v. Young, 44 Mich. 339 (1880) ;
Neverman v. Neverman, 254 N. Y. 496, 173 N. E. 838" (1930) ; Best v.
Grolapp, 69 Neb. 811, 96 N. W. 641 (1903), on rehearing, 69 Neb. 811, 99
N. W. 837 (1904) ; Barrett v. Schleich, 37 Ore. 613, 62 Pac. 792 (1900)
Engle v. Engle, 209 Mich. 275, 176 N. W11. 547 (1920).
71. Cases cited at note 68 supra illustrate this proposition. However it
should be kept in mind that if the land is not occupied by the promisor, the
promisee may take immediate possession. Sometime a father will agree to
convey a farm other than the home place to one of his children in con-
sideration of personal services to be rendered to him. In the following
cases the promisee did take exclusive possession subsequent to the contract.
Stillings v. Stillings, 67 N. H. 584, 42 Atl. 271 (1894); Bohanan v. Bo-
hanan, 96 Ill. 591 (1880) ; McDowell v. Lucas, 97 Ill. 489 (1881) ; Harlan
v. Harlan, 273 Ill. 155, 112 N. E. 452 (1916) ; Mahannah v. Mahannah, 292
I1. 133, 126 N. E. 573 (1920) ; Atkinson v. Jackson, 8 Ind. 31 (1856) ; States
v. Hill, 10 Ind. 176 (1858) ; Law v. Henry, 39 Ind. 414 (1872) ; Cutsinger
v. Ballard, 115 Ind. 93, 17 N. E. 206 (1888) ; Starkey v. Starkey, 136 Ind.
349, 36 N. E. 287 (1894) ; Fairfield v. Barbour, 51 Mich. 57 (1883).
1951]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
well as nominally the head of the household. In such instance the
father not-the son is in possession.
Casting aside artificial results caused by the application of rules
created for other types of situations, modern judges if unhampered
by prior adjudication tend to group cases involving services into a
separate class. The test is not whether possession has been delivered
or whether valuable improvements have been added; for the parties
themselves do not anticipate such acts. One of two standards is
substituted for the traditional criteria in the more recent cases. If
either the plaintiff changes the course of his life in reliance on the
promise,7 2 or if he renders personal services of a nature that are in-
capable of pecuniary valuation, under the terms of the contract,
he has partly performed. 73
The former situation often arises where a relative is induced to
move his home from some distant point to a spot near the offeror.7-
72. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 55 Ark. 583, 18 S. W. 1049 (1892) ; Nelson v.
Schoonover, 89 Kan. 388, 131 Pac. 147 (1913) ; Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Mich.
112 (1881) ; Twiss v. George, 33 Mich. 253 (1876) ; Duncan v. Duncan, 288
Mich 306, 284 N. W. 723 (1939) ; Hajek v. Hajek, 108 Neb. 503, 188 N. W.
181 (1922) ; Atwood v. Voks, 183 Ore. 69, 189 P. 2d 568 (1948) ; Hendershot
v. Hendershot, 135 N. J. Eq. 232, 37 A. 2d 770 (1944) ; Cranes Nest Coal
and Coke Co. v. Virginia Iron Coal and Coke Co., 108 Va. 862, 62 S. E.
954 (1908).
73. Andrews v. Aikens, 44 Idaho 797, 260 Pac. 423 (1927) ; Jones v.
Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P. 2d 963 (1947) ; Weir v. Weir, 287 Ill. 495,
122 N. E. 868 (1919); Lounsberry v. Deverman, 299 Ill. 493, 132 N. E.
485 (1921) ; Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A. 2d 639 (1940);
Parker v. Page, 270 Mass. 167, 169 N. E. 915 (1930) ; Stellmacher v.
Bruder, 89 Minn. 507, 99 Am. St. Rep. 609 (1903) ; Richardson v. Richard-
son, 114 Minn. 12, 130 N. W. 4 (1911) ; Bennett v. Harrison 115 Minn. 342,
132 N. W. 309 (1911) ; Haubrick v. Haubrick, 118 Minn. 394, 136 N. W.
1025 (1912); Chapel v. Chapel, 132 Minn. 86, 155 N. W. 1054 (1916);
Greenfield v. Peterson, 141 Minn. 475, 170 N. W. 696 (1919) ; Whitman v.
Dittman, 154 Minn. 346, 191 N. W. 821 (1923); Olson v. Dixon, 165 Minn.
124, 205 N. W. 955 (1926) ; Selle v. Selle, 377 Mo. 1234, 88 S. W. 2d 877(1936) ; Teske v. Dittberner, 65 Neb. 167, 91 N. W. 181, 101 Am. St. Rep.
614 (1902); Weeks v. Lund, 69 N. H. 78, 45 Atl. 249 (1897) ; Muir v.
Bartlett, 78 N. H. 313, 99 Atl. 553 (1916) ; Ludwig v. Bungart, 48 App.
Div. 613, 63 N. Y. Supp. 91 (1900) ; Braun v. Ocha, 77 App. Div. 20, 79
N. Y. Supp. 100 (1902) ; Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588, 144 N. E.
715 (1924) ; Snyder v. Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 86 N. E. 2d 489 (1949) ;
Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211, 132 Pac. 535 (1913) ; McKowen v. McDonald,
43 Pa. St. (7 Wr.) 441 (1863) ; Lang v. Chase, 130 Me. 267, 155 Atl. 273(1931) ; Smith v. Pierce, 65 Vt. 200, 25 Atl. 1092 (1892) ; Venable v. Bays &
Stamper, 102 Va. 30, 45 S. E. 738 (1903) ; Adams v. Snodgrass, 175 Va. 1,
7 S. E. 2d 147 (1940) ; Clark v. Atkins, 188 Va. 668, 51 S. E. 2d 222 (1949);
Hurley v. Beattie, 98 W. Va. 125, 126 S. E. 562 (1925).
74. Wilcox v. Powell's Estate, 206 Wis. 513, 240 N. W. 122 (1932)
Laune v. Chandless, 99 N. J. Eq. 186, 131 Atl. 634 (1926); Giradot v.
Giradot, 172 Ga. 230. 157 S. E. 282 (1931) ; Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12
N. J. Eq. (1 Beas.) 142 (1858) : Danehauer v. Danehauer, 105 N. J. Eq. .449,
148 Atl. 390 (1930), aft'd. 107 N. J. Eq. 597, 153 Atl. 906 (1931) ; Sitton v.
Shipp, 65 Mo. 297 (1877) ; Frierke v. Elgin City Banking Co., 359 Ill.
394, 194 N. E. 528 (1935).
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Remaining at home at a relative's request and in consideration of an
agreement to devise the land, when other places seemed more in-
Services considered not to be subject to financial measurement
viting to the promisee, is another example of the type of change in
position contemplated by the statute.
7 5
usually relate to caring for an invalid or aged relative"6 or a close
friend, on the promise of a reward. The services must be the con-
sideration for the oral agreement which the plaintiff seeks to
enforce.
77
No distinction is made between oral contracts to devise and oral
contracts to convey when the consideration is either a change of
position by the promisee or services rendered to the promisor.
In the case of agreements to devise, some tribunals require that
evidence be presented showing a contract arrived at in face to face
negotiations, 78 while others permit the agreement to be establi'shed
by declarations of the agreement made to third parties.7 9
75. Ozeas v. Scarcliff, 200 Iowa 1078, 205 N. W. 986 (1926); Smith
v. Yocum, 110 Ill. 142 (1884) ; Moline v. Carlson, 92 Neb. 419, 138 N. W.
721 (1912) ; Fox v. Fox, 117 Okla. 46, 245 Pac. 641 (1926).
76. Manning v. Franklin, 81 Cal. 205, 22 Pac. 550 (1889) ; Owens- v.
McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710, 33 L. R. A. 369 (1896); White v.
Smith, 43 Idaho 354, 253 Pac. 849 (1927) ; Willis v. Zorger, 258 Ill. 574,
101 N. E. 963 (1913); Chambers v. Appel, 392 Ill. 294, 64 N. E. 2d 511
(1946); Mauck v. Melton, 64 Ind. 414 (1878); Franklin v. Tuckerman,
6S Iowa 572, 27 N. W. 759 (1886) ; Houlette v. Johnson, 205 Iowa 687,
216 N. W. 679 (1928) ; Bichel v. Oliver, 77 Kan. 696, 95 Pac. 396 (1908) ;
Neal v. Hamilton, 159 Md. 447, 150 At. 867 (1930); Mannix v. Baum-
gardner, 184 Md. 600, 42 A. 2d 124 (1945) ; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237,
118 N. W. 953 (1908) ; Lamb v. Herman, 46 Mich. 112, 8 N. W. 709 (1881) ;
Svenburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4, 43 L. R. A. 427, 74 Am. St.
Rep. 490 (1899) ; Brasch v. Reeves, 124 Minn. 114, 144 N. W. 744 (1913) ;
Roberson v. Corcoran, 125 Minn. 118. 145 N. W. 812 (1914); Gupton v.
Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870) ; Hratt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 214 (1880) ; Sports-
man v. Halstead, 347 Mo. 286, 147 S. W. 2d 447 (1941) ; Johnson v. Rise-
berg, 90 Neb. 217, 133 N. W. 183 (1911) ; Davis v. Murphy, 105 Neb. 839,
182 N. W. 365 (1921); Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beas.) 246
(1861) ; Cooper v. Colson, 66 N. J. Eq. 328, 58 Atl. 337, 105 Am. St. Rep.
660 (Err. & App. 1904) ; Tothrop v. Marble, 12 S. D. 511, 81 N. W. 885(1900) ; Hanson v. Fresler, 49 S. D. 442, 207 N. W. 449 (1926) ; Gassett
v. Harris, 48 S. W. 2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Leverett v. Leverett,
59 S. W. 2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Milton v. Kite, 114 Va. 256, 76
S. E. 313 (1912) ; Cannon v. Cannon, 158 Va. 12, 163 S. E. 405 (1932) ;
Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501 (1917) ; Velikanje v.
Dehman, 98 Wash. 584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917) ; Slavin v. Ackerman, 119
Wash. 48, 204 Pac. 816 (1922) ; Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 2
Wash. 2d 470, 98 P. 2d 667 (1940).
77. Cook v. Ely, 116 N. W. 129 (Iowa 1908) ; Simmes v. Worthingon,
38 Md. 298 (1873) ; Riley v. Riley, 150 Neb. 176, 33 N. W. 2d 525 (1948) ;
Tucker v. Kirkpatrick, 86 Ore. 677, 169 Pac. 117 (1917) ; Clawson v. Brewer,
67 N. J. Eq. 201, 58 AtI. 598 (1904) ; Stark v. Wilder, 36 Vt. 572 (1864) ;
Wright v. Pucket, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 370 (1872); Wright v. Dudley, 189 Va.
448, 53 S. E. 2d 29 (1949).
78. Ackerman v. Fisher, 57 Pa. St. (7 Smith P. F.) 457 (1868).
79. Mayo v. Mayo, 302 Ill. 584, 135 N. E. 90 (1922).
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Adjudicating each case on its own facts, judges generally have
been reluctant to impose a rigid formula to govern all litigation.
When has a person changed the course of his life? What prescisely
are services that are incapable of pecuniary measurement? These
obviously are matters that can be determined only in the light
of the facts of each case. The court has the parties before it, and if
there is any uncertainty as to whether or not the promisor agreed
to devise his land, or if the claim is a pretended one, the withholding
of specific performance is proper.
That an occasional case smacks of fraud or a judge is required
to read a great many decisions involving similar cases, 0 each of
which is decided on its own facts, is no excuse for rejecting part
performance in this type of case. A defrauding promisor should
not be permitted to hide behind the statute if the promisee has sus-
tained injury because of reliance on the oral agreement.
ACTS OF PART PERFORMANCE WHERE DELIVERY OF POSSESSION
IS IMPOSSIBLE-"CONTINUED"-RAuD
Acts other than delivery of possession, adding of valuable im-
provements, or the furnishing of personal services are considered
as part performance if the vendee is placed in such a position that
a fraud will be prepetrated upon him if the contract is not enforced.
While in a sense all the various factual situations stated in the
foregoing paragraphs may result in fraud if the statute is strictly
applied, the emphasis is placed upon the nature of the act in deter-
mining whether part performance has taken the contract from the
enactment's purview.
Transfer of possession furnishes a ready example of the dis-
tinction. Because delivery of possession has been adjudged to be
part performance, a purchaser is now required only to show that he
has been placed in possession, not that a fraud will be perpetrated
upon him. A comparable case arises when a purchaser makes capital
expenditure in anticipation that property will be conveyed to him.
Although the buyer may be defrauded he does not have to claim
fraud to evoke equitable aid. Past cases have adjudicated that he
has partly performed. The same may be said in respect to con-
tracts to convey or devise when the consideration is personal serv-
ices; for the rendition of the services is part performance. It is
the fact that the service cannot be evaluated rather than the con-
sequences that is determinative of the issue. The possibility of fraud
80. See Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 172 P. 2d 189 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1946).
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may have been a reason for granting relief in the initial case. Now,
the important point is the nature of the act.
There is, however, a miscellaieous category of acts which con-
stitute part performance, not because of the nature of the incidents
performed but because of the consequences that result from the
vendor's failure to perform. In the various factual situations in this
group the strict application of the Statute of Frauds would foster
frauds.
Broad in scope, the category embraces acts of many varieties.
The general principle applied to causes in the fraud group has been
stated by Justice Story as follows:
"Nothing is better settled than that the true construction of this
statute does not exclude the enforcement of parol agreements
respecting the sale of lands in case of fraud; for as it has been
very emphatically said, that would make a statute purposely
made to prevent frauds, the veriest instrument of fraud."8 '
Since the possibilities of fraud are confined only to the limits
of man's imagination it is difficult to fashion a factual pattern for
adjudging these cases.
However, the types of behavior that courts have deemed
fraudulent may be gleaned from prior cases. Failure to keep a
promise to convey to a mortgagor if he would refrain from bidding
at the foreclosure sale ;82 refusal to sell a house to a prospective
purchaser who had obtained governmental priorities necessary for
its construction ;83 abrogation of an oral contract to transfer land
to plaintiff in consideration of a conveyance of purchaser's prior
interest to the promisor ;84 repudiation of an agreement to divide
an estate in return for the purchaser's promise to forbear filing a
caveat to a will ;85 refusal to perform a promise to convey after the
vendee bad released dower and homestead rights in accordance with
the contract,"6 are representative factual situations.
Familiar to Minnesota jurists are the cases of Brown v. Hoag8 7
and Slingerland v. Slingerland,8 both of which fall within this
category.
In the former litigation, Hoag relinquished his claim to prop-
81. Cited in McBurney v. Wellman, 42 Barb. Ch. 390 (N.Y. 1864).
82. Stark v. Wilder, 36 Vt. 752 (1864); cf. Canada v. Totten, 157
N. Y. 281, 51 N. E. 989 (1898).
83. Hatch v. Walack, 316 Mich. 258, 25 N. W. 2d 191 (1946).
84. Alexander v. McDaniel, 56 S. C. 252, 34 S. E. 405 (1899).
85. Watkins v. Watkins, 24 Ga. 402 (1858).
86. Farwell v. Johnston, 34 Mich. 342 (1876).
87. 35 Minn. 373, 29 N. W. 135 (1886).
88. 39 Minn. 197, 39 N. W. 146 (1888).
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erty described in a certain deed in consideration of a quitclaim deed
and bill of sale to be executed in favor of his wife.
The Slingerland controversy originated through a promise made
by a father to his son, the former agreeing to convey if the latter
would dismiss actions at law pending against the father, and in
addition marry a certain young lady selected by the parent.
Both of the parol contracts were enforced on the ground that
the vendor's failure to perform would result in injury to the vendee.
Stated the court in the Hoag case:
"As already remarked, the doctrine of part performance rests
on the ground of fraud. The underlying principle is that where
one of the contracting parties has been induced or allowed to
alter his situation on the faith of an oral agreement within the
statute, to such an extent that it would be a fraud on the part of
the other party to set up its invalidity, equity will make the case
an exception to the statute."
8 9
While applicable to the case at bar, the reasoning advanced by
the court does not apply to all cases of part performance. Reading
such meaning into the principles pronounced in the Hoag contro-
versy, the same court in later cases stated fraud formed the only
basis for the enforcement of oral contracts for the sale of lands. 90
This error in so far as Minnesota is concerned was not corrected
until five years ago in the case of Shaughnessy v. Eidsnzo.91
In 1946 the Minnesota Court, recognizing the distinction be-
tween the possession and the fraud cases, made clear that more
than one type of act may constitute part performance. While Brovn
v. Hoag was expressly overruled, in so far as the possession cases
were concerned, it was unnecessary to do so in order to decide
the Shaughnessy92 litigation. The two controversies were based on
different principles and facts.
The cases adjudicated on the fraud theory of part performance
represent a catch-all in which the only element in common is the
fraud of the vendor in not performing after he has induced the
89. 35 Minn. 373, 377, 29 N. W. 135, 138 (1886).
90. Mournin v. Trainor, 63 Minn. 230, 65 N. W. 444 (1895) ; Jorgenson
v. Jorgenson, 81 Minn. 428, 84 N. W. 221 (1900); Veum v. Sherran, 95
Minn. 315, 104 N. W. 135 (1905).
91. 222 Minn. 141, 23 N. W. 2d 362 (1946).
92. While the Minne'ota cases adjudicated after Brown v. Hoag and
prior to Shaughnessey v. Eidsmo declared that fraud was the principle un-
derlying part performance, the author did not discover a single case decided
during that period which involved the single point of delivery of possession
by the vendee. It is submitted that Atkins v. Little, 17 Minn. 342 (1871)
which held that delivery of possession to the vendee is part performance, was
never overruled. Atkins v. Little and Shau.qhnessy v. Eidsino can be dis-
tinguished from the fraud, and the permanent improvement cases.
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vendee to relinquish a valuable right as consideration for the
contract.
GIFTS AND PART PERFORMANCE
While the law of gifts is not within the purview of this discus-
sion, it is necessary because of the language used in some of the
cases to distinguish a gratuitous transfer of land from a sale.
It is settled beyond dispute that a bare oral promise to make a
gift will not be enforced in equity." There is a split of authority on
the question of whether or not a promise to make a gift will be
specifically executed if the prospective donee has been induced to
improve the subject matter of the donation upon the promise that
it will be his at some future date. Although there is no uniformity
as to the principles underlying the rule, the majority of jurisdictions
favor specific performance upon a showing that the donee has
relied to his injury on the donor's offer to make a gift.94
Stating that the adding of improvements furnishes consideration
in equity, one line of cases holds that the promise will be specifically
enforced in that forum.9 5 Other authorities suggest that it would be
inequitable to refuse specific execution and find an equity has been
raised if the voluntary promise has induced the donee to act to
his detriment.9 8
In adjudging cases of this nature, judges do not always realize
that instead of a promise to make a future gift, the promisor may
intend to enter into a contract, the word gift having been used in its
broad sense to mean a grant of land in any form.
The distinction between a gratuitous transfer and one based
93. Meigs v. Morris, 63 Ark. 100, 37 S. W. 302 (1896) ; Murphy v.
Graves, 170 Ark. 180, 279 S. W. 359 (1926) ; Mitchell v. Redus, 144 Ark.
332, 222 S. W. 47 (1920) ; Bame v. Bame, 250 Mich. 515, 231 N. W. 60(1930) ; Snow v. Snow, 98 Minn. 348, 108 N. W. 295 (1906); Trebesch v.
Trebesch, 130 Minn. 368, 153 N. W. 754 (1915) ; Gibbs v. Whitwell, 164
Mo. 387, 64 S. W. 110 (1901). Brown, A Treatise on the Statute of Frauds
598 (5 ed. 1895) ; Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 38, at 332.
94. Cases cited in footnotes 95 and 96 infra support this conclusion.
The cases cited in the discussion of gifts are represented only. No attempt
has been made to collect all or any considerable portion of the cases.
95. Gynn v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97 (1877) ; White v. Ingram, 110
Mo. 474, 195 S. W. 827 (1892); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 140 Mo. 300, 41
S. W. 749 (1897).
96. Osterhaus v. Crewston, 62 Ind. App. 382, 111 N. E. 634 (1916);
Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa 280 (1858) ; Hardesty v. Richards, 44 Md. 617,
22 Am. Rep. 57 (1876) ; Dougherty v. Harsel, 91 Mo. 161, 3 S. W. 583
(1886) ; National Newark & Essex Banking Company of Newark v. Work,
108 N. J. Eq. 76. 154 Atl. 11 (1931) ; Messeash Home for Children v. Rogers,
166 App. Div. 366, 146 N. Y. Supp. 711, aff'd, 212 N. Y. 315, 106 N. E.
59 (1914) ; Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac. 767, 8 L. R. A. (n.s.) 870
(1906).
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on consideration is brought sharply into focus by Section 90 of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts. There it is stated:
"A promise which the promisee should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce some
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise."
The typical controversy originates from an informal offer
whereby the promisor may state to his son or to one of his other
relatives, "If you will clear the south forty and build a house, I'll
deed it to you."
Reasoning that the performance of the agreement will not be
beneficial to the offeror, courts treat the above offer as a promise to
make a gift. Is not the loss to the promisee in terms of time, money
and inconveniences sufficient consideration to support the agree-
ment? Must it be beneficial to the promisor? Under the rule an-
nounced by the better authorities, detriment to the promisee in-
curred through performance of the agreement will constitute con-
sideration .7 The example cited above if performed is a contract
and not a gift.98
The important point in determining the character of the agree-
ment is whether or not performance was pursuant to, and in reli-
ance on the promise. If this be established the agreement is a
contract. If on the other hand the promise relates to acts already
performed, the promise is gratuitous, and is subject to equitable
principles relating to gifts, which have been described above.
Because gifts are not enforceable except in very special circum-
stances in some jurisdictions,9 it is wise to make the distinction be-
tween voluntary promises and contracts of sale in each instance,
even though in some states the result would be the same in either
type of case. 100
THE CASE FOR REPEALING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Writing a century ago, the biographer of Lord Nottingham
recounted that the latter was the "author of the most important and
97. 1 Williston, Contracts 384 (Rev. ed. 1936).
98. Cases illustrating the distinction are Bigelow v. Bigelow, 95 Me.
17, 49 Atl. 49 (1901) ; Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 327 (1867) ; and Free-
man v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34, 3 Am. Rep. 657 (1870).
99. The cases cited in footnotes 95 and 96 supra require that valuable
improvement be added to the premises. Possession alone will not be con-
sidered an act of part performance.
100. Anson v. Townsend, 73 Cal. 415, 15 Pac. 49 (1887) ; Galbraith v.
Galbraith, 5 Kan. 402 (1870) ; Horner v. McConnell, 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E.
472 (1902) ; Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac. 767, 8 L. R. A. (n.s.) 870
(1906).
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most beneficial piece of juridical legislation of which we can
boast."10'
A number of years and several thousand cases later, a weary
and perplexed judge likewise evaluated the same piece of legisla-
tion. But through the years the complexion of the Statute must
have changed, for in this instance, the commentator declared, "I
speak perhaps, with excusable warmth upon this subject because
I have devoted a great deal of time, which might have been better
employed, to this piece of morbid anatomy."'10 2
More temporate in his appraisal, the foremost legal historian of
our century proposed that the Statute filled a need at the time of
its adoption, but that it has not outlived its usefulness. However in
fairness to Lord Nottingham, the critic of the Enactment pointed
out that it was dealing with unknown problems which could not
have been reasonably foreseen.'
0 3
On the British side of the Atlantic, the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the Statute has culminated in the recommendation that
it be repealed. 0 4 At least three factors have contributed to this move
to abolish the Statute in its entirety.
The first cause was legislation enacted by Parliament in 1851105
which removed the disqualification of the parties in civil actions.
Prior to that date, the defendant could not testify in his own be-
half, "' creating a real likelihood that he might be perjured out of
his estate. Once the disqualification was removed, the defendant
could completely explain the transaction and no greater danger
existed in respect to contracts for the sale of lands than in other
types of transactions.
The second factor which tended to destroy the utility of the
Statute was the great body of case law that came into being by
reason of litigation on poorly drafter sections of the Act. This
problem was highlighted by Lord Wright in a review of Williston's
Treatise on Contracts.
Stated the reviewer with respect to the discussion on Sections
Four and Seventeen of the Statute, "It is to be observed that the
discussion of these two sections which consist of perhaps 200 or
101. 2 Campbell, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Keepers of the
Seal 421 (1846).
102. Justice Stephens cited in Note, 43 L. Q. Rev. 1, 2 (1927).
103. 6 Holdsworth, History of the English Law 396 (1924).
104. The Lord Chancellors' Committee on Law Revision, Sixth Interim
Report (Cmd 5 449) 4-12 (1937).
105. Statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99 (1851).
106. 2 Wigmore, Evidence 683 (3d ed. 1940).
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300 words in all occupies just over 400 pages of the book. How
many thousands of cases are cited I do not know."'
1 7
Disagreement by the judiciary with the policy of the statute is
the third cause that has contributed to its disfavor. Why should
this particular type of agreement be reduced to writing when
thousands of other contracts involving large fiancial transactions
may be enforced solely on parol testimony of oral agreements?
Summing up this objection one jurist has declared:
"I have sometimes in more formal moods said to myself that no
contract should be enforceable unless it is a written contract, in
other words, that the valid formation of the contract should be
conditioned by its being reduced to writing. But a little re-
flection has also told me that not only every day bargains but
many more important contracts are made and done by word of
mouth."1 08
Judges have constantly found that a strict application of the
Statute as written would produce more frauds than it would pre-
vent, and they have therefore not hesitated to find grounds for
exceptions in the interest of justice when the exigencies of the case
so demands.
Unquestionably, conflict of policies created by the Statute
causes it to be a perpetual source of litigation. If all facts are con-
sidered it is doubtful if Section Four of the Statute serves a useful
purpose in the time in which we live.
CONCLUSION
Judges and text writers have generally believed that the prin-
ciples underlying the doctrine of part performance have been fairly
worked out, but that the cases are irreconcilable and that the whole
law on this subject is in a state of confusion.
The converse may be true for it is the doctrine of part per-
formance that is in a state of confusion and not the law. This has
happened despite the fact that the courts have misconstrued statutes,
disregarded precedents, and fabricated their own reasons for reach-
ing desired results. Perhaps the causes for the consistent results
generally achieved is so simple that judges have stumbled over it
while looking for some complicated formula. Could it be that the
fundamental idea which has guided the development of part per-
107. Wright, Book Review, 55 L. Q. Rev. 189, 203 (1939).
108. Id. at 204.
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formance is only that the "statute must not be made a cloak for
fraud,"' 0 9 in the sense that fraud implies dishonest conduct.
In any event in the great majority of jurisdictions any one of the
following factual situations are considered to be acts of part per-
formance and will take a parol contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
1. Delivery of possession to the vendee, or the vendor's assent
to the former's act of taking possession.
2. Capital improvements made pursuant to and in reliance on an
oral agreement if they are made with the assent of the vendor.
3. Change of position or the rendition of personal services in-
capable of pecuniary evaluation when performed in consideration
of a promise to devise or convey real property.
4. Probability of a perpetration of a fraud by the vendor where
the vendee has performed a promise to relinquish a valuable right
in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Once part performance has been determined, whether or not
specific performance will be decreed will depend on the equities in
the case and whether the vendee has performed.
While there are deviations in respect to minor points the major
facts that constitute part performance have been judicially deter-
mined in most of the states. But however refined may be the classi-
fication of the principles and the factual situations of the law of
part performance, there will always be a tremendous amount of
litigation so long as the Statute remains on the books. Each com-
bination of facts presents a new case. Each set of circumstances
raises afresh the conflict between the basic policy of the Statute and
the equities inherent in acts of part performance. Each judge feels
constrained to determine the equities in accordance with his own
notion of the place of the statute in our system of jurisprudence.
In conclusion it may be stated that the bulk of the case law is so
great that its usefulness as precedent is impaired. After examining
cases from all American jurisdictions covering a period of 150
years we heartily endorse the recommendations of a distinguished
equity scholar, who, after experiencing the same difficulties, de-
clared:
109. 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 103, at 659. Holdsworth states,
"On the other hand, the fact that the grant of this relief was discretionary
made it possible for equity to look closely at the conduct of the parties, and
to insist that it should be fair and reasonable. It was partly the insistence
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"But the more extensively one gives consideration to the re-
ported record of the struggle between a statutory policy of 1677
and the human feeling of the judiciary from then to now, the
more the thought comes that there is much in the proposal of
the Lord Chancellor's Committee on Law Revision that the
Statute of Frauds be repealed in its entirety."110
upon a high standard of honesty which was at the root of the equitable
modification of the statute of Frauds, which developed into the doctrine of
part performance. . . From the first, equity insisted that the statute must
not be made a cloak for fraud."
110. Simpson, Equity in 1947 Annual Survey of American Law 817
(1948).
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